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Abstract. Biometric identity-based encryption (Bio-IBE) is a kind of
fuzzy identity-based encryption (fuzzy IBE) where a ciphertext encrypted
under an identity w′ can be decrypted using a secret key corresponding to
the identity w which is close to w′ as measured by some metric. Recently,
Yang et al. proposed a constant-size Bio-IBE scheme and proved that it
is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) in the ran-
dom oracle model. Unfortunately, in this paper, we will show that their
Bio-IBE scheme is even not chosen-plaintext secure. Specifically, user w
using his secret key is able to decrypt any ciphertext encrypted under
an identity w′ even though w is not close to w′.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis; Biometric identity-based encryption; Chosen-
ciphertext secure; Chosen-plaintext secure
1 Introduction
To simplify the certificate management in traditional public key infrastructure,
Shamir [1] first introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography in 1984.
In this scenario, a user’s public key is derived from his identity, e.g., his e-mail
address, and his secret key is generated by a trusted third party called private
key generator (PKG) who has knowledge of a master secret key. In 2001, the
first two practical identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes were presented in [2]
and [3], respectively.
The notion of fuzzy identity-based encryption (fuzzy IBE) was introduced by
Sahai and Waters [4] in 2005, where each identity is viewed as a set of descriptive
attributes. A fuzzy IBE scheme is very similar to a standard IBE scheme except
that a ciphertext encrypted under an identity w′ can be decrypted using the
secret key associated with the identity w which is close to w′ as judged by some
metric. The error-tolerance property of fuzzy IBE enables biometric attributes to
be used in a standard IBE scheme. In 2007, Burnett et al. [5] proposed the first
biometric identity-based signature (Bio-IBS) scheme, where they used biometric
information to construct the identity of a user. The first biometric identity-based
⋆ Corresponding author. E-mail: miaotian@mail.ustc.edu.cn (M. Tian).
encryption (Bio-IBE) scheme was proposed by Sarier [6] in 2008. It absorbed the
advantage of Burnett et al.’s Bio-IBS scheme. Subsequently, Sarier [7] presented
an improved Bio-IBE scheme which is secure against a new type of denial of
service attack. Recently, Yang et al. [8] presented a constant-size Bio-IBE scheme
and proved that it is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2)
in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this paper, we will show that their
scheme is even not chosen-plaintext secure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some
preliminaries required in this paper. In Section 3, we review Yang et al.’s Bio-
IBE scheme. In section 4, we present an attack on their Bio-IBE scheme. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear pairing
Let G andGT be two groups with the same prime order p. A map e : G×G→ GT
is called a bilinear map if it satisfies the following three properties.
1. Bilinearity: For all a, b ∈ Zp and u, v ∈ G, we have e(u
a, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists u, v ∈ G such that e(u, v) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any
u, v ∈ G.
2.2 Biometric identity-based encryption
As mentioned above, a Bio-IBE scheme is essentially a fuzzy IBE scheme, with
the only difference that it uses a set of biometric attributes as a user’s identity.
Therefore, a Bio-IBE scheme also consists of the following four algorithms [4]:
– Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG generates a master secret
key MSK and the public parameters PP which contains a threshold d. The
PKG publishes the public parameters PP and keeps the master key MSK
secret.
– Extract: Given the public parameters PP , the master secret key MSK
and a user’s biometric attribute set w = (µ1, · · · , µn), the PKG generates a
secret key skw for the user.
– Encrypt: On input the public parameters PP , a message m and a user’s
biometric attribute set w′ = (µ′1, · · · , µ
′
n), it returns a ciphertext C
′.
– Decrypt: On input the public parameters PP , a secret key skw correspond-
ing to the user w, and a ciphertext C′ encrypted under the set of attributes
w′, it outputs the message if and only if |w′
⋂
w| ≥ d.
The security notion for Bio-IBE proposed by Yang et al. [8] is indistinguisha-
bility of ciphertext under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-sID-CCA2). A
weaker security notion proposed in [4] is indistinguishability of ciphertext under
chosen plaintext attack (IND-sID-CPA). Its formal definition is based on the
following game played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
– Init. The adversary A outputs a target attribute set w′ = (µ′1, · · · , µ
′
n).
– Setup. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and sends the system
parameters PP to the adversary A.
– Phase 1. The adversary A adaptively delivers secret key extraction queries
on many attribute sets wi, where |w
′
⋂
wi| < d for all i. The challenger C
runs the Extract algorithm to obtain a private key skwi for each wi and
sends the result to A.
– Challenge. The adversary A submits two equal length messages m0 and
m1. The challenger C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts mb under
w′. Then C sends the ciphertext to A.
– Phase 2. The adversary A issues additional secret key extraction queries as
in Phase 1.
– Guess. The adversary A outputs a guess b′ of b and wins if b′ = b.
The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2|.
Definition 1.A Bio-IBE scheme is IND-sID-CPA secure if there is no polynomial-
time adversary that succeeds in the above game with a non-negligible advantage.
2.3 Fuzzy Extraction
Fuzzy extraction process is essential for many Bio-IBE schemes such as [6,7,8].
Let M = {0, 1}k be a finite dimensional metric space with a distance function
dis :M×M −→ Z+. An (M, l, t) fuzzy extractor consists of the following two
functions Gen and Rep:
– Gen: This function takes as input a biometric template b ∈ M. It outputs
an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}l and a public parameter PAR. The biometric tem-
plate b is unique for each user since it is a concatenation of user’s biometric
attributes.
– Rep: This function takes as input a biometric template b′ ∈ M and the
public parameter PAR. It outputs the identity ID if dis(b, b′) ≤ t. In other
words, we can obtain the same identity ID as long as b′ is “close” to b.
For two biometric attribute sets w and w′, we assume that dis(b, b′) ≤ t if
|w′
⋂
w| ≥ d and thus we have ID = ID′, where (b, ID) and (b′, ID′) are
extracted from w and w′, respectively.
3 Review of Yang et al.’s Bio-IBE scheme
Let ∆i,S(x) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j
denote the Lagrange coefficient for i ∈ Z∗p and a set
S of elements in Z∗p. The Yang et al.’s Bio-IBE [8] is specified as follows.
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG does:
1. Choose two groups G and GT with the same prime order p, a bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT and a generator g of G.
2. Select two hash functions H : b→ {0, 1}∗ and H1 : Z
∗
p × {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗p.
3. Pick s ∈ Z∗p and g1 ∈ G uniformly at random, and set g2 = g
s.
4. The public parameters are PP = (G,GT , e, g, g1, g2, d,H,H1) and the master
key is s.
Extract: Given a user’s biometric attribute set w = (µ1, · · · , µn), the PKG
does:
1. Compute ID = H(b) and PAR = Gen(b), where b is a concatenation of each
µi (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
2. Choose a random d− 1 degree polynomial q(x) ∈ Z∗p[x] such that q(0) = s.
3. For each i ∈ [n], compute di,1 = (g1 · g
H1(ID))q(µi) and di,2 = g
q(µi).
4. Send the private key skw = (di,1, di,2)µi∈w to the user and publish PAR.
Encrypt: On input the public parameters PP , a message m ∈ GT and an
identity w′ = (µ′1, · · · , µ
′
n), the sender does:
1. Get the public parameter PAR of the receiver and compute ID′ = Rep(b′, PAR),
where b′ is a concatenation of each µ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
2. Choose r ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random.
3. Compute C1 = g
r, C2 = (g
H1(ID
′))r and C3 = m · e(g1, g2)
r.
4. Send C′ = (w′, C1, C2, C3).
Decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext C′ encrypted under the attribute set
w′, a user with attribute set w satisfying |w′
⋂
w| ≥ d does:
1. Choose an arbitrary set S ⊆ w′
⋂
w such that |S| = d.
2. Compute m = C3 ·
e
(
C2,
∏
µi∈S
(di,2)
∆µi,S
(0)
)
e
(
C1,
∏
µi∈S
(di,1)
∆µi,S
(0)
) .
The Decrypt algorithm works since ID = ID′ when |w′
⋂
w| ≥ d and
C3 ·
e
(
C2,
∏
µi∈S
(di,2)
∆µi,S(0)
)
e
(
C1,
∏
µi∈S
(di,1)
∆µi,S(0)
)
= C3 ·
e
(
(gH1(ID
′))r,
∏
µi∈S
(gq(µi))∆µi,S(0)
)
e
(
gr,
∏
µi∈S
(g1 · gH1(ID))
q(µi)·∆µi,S(0)
)
= C3 ·
e
(
gH1(ID
′)·r, gs
)
e
(
gr, (g1 · gH1(ID))s
)
= m · e(g1, g2)
r ·
e
(
gH1(ID)·r, gs
)
e
(
gs, (g1 · gH1(ID))r
)
= m · e(g1, g
s)r/e
(
gs, (g1)
r
)
= m
Remark. Compared to the scheme in [8], there is a small (but important) mod-
ification in the above scheme. Namely, we use H1(ID) (resp. H1(ID
′)) instead
of H1(w, ID) (resp. H1(w
′, ID′)). We know that, for two random strings w and
w′, H1(w, ID) = H1(w
′, ID) cannot be true in general. Therefore, the original
Decrypt algorithm in [8] may fail. In our modified scheme, the Decrypt algo-
rithm will work since H1(ID) = H1(ID
′) when |w′
⋂
w| ≥ d. In fact, H1(ID)
plays the same role as H1(w, ID) in this scheme.
4 The proposed attack
Yang et al. [8] proved that their scheme is IND-sID-CCA2 secure in the random
oracle model. However, in this section, we show that their scheme is even not
IND-sID-CPA secure. Assume that the target attribute set is w′ = (µ′1, · · · , µ
′
n).
A polynomial time adversary A attacks Yang at al.’s Bio-IBE scheme as follows:
1. In the Setup phase, the adversaryA obtains the system parameters PP from
a challenger C.
2. In Phase 1, the adversary A makes a secret key extraction query on an
attribute set w, where |w′
⋂
w| < d. The challenger C runs the Extract
algorithm to obtain a private key skw for w and sends the result to A.
3. In Challenge phase, A submits two equal length messages m0 and m1. The
challenger C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and runs algorithmEncrypt(mb, w
′)
to obtain a ciphertext C′b. Then C sends C
′
b to A.
4. In Phase 2, A does not issue any query.
5. Let skw = (di,1, di,2)µi∈w = ((g1 · g
H1(ID))q(µi), gq(µi))µi∈w. Upon receiving
the ciphertext C′b = (w
′, C1, C2, C3) = (w
′, gr, (gH1(ID
′))r ,mb · e(g1, g2)
r), A
determines the bit b by performing the following steps:
(a) For each µi ∈ w, compute g
q(µi)
1 = di,1/d
H1(ID)
i,2 .
(b) Select an arbitrary set S ⊆ w such that |S| = d.
(c) Output mb = C3/(
∏
µi∈S
e(C1, g
q(µi)
1 )
∆µi,S(0)).
We can verify its correctness as follows:
C3
∏
µi∈S
e(C1, g
q(µi)
1 )
∆µi,S(0)
=
mb · e(g1, g2)
r
∏
µi∈S
e(gr, g
q(µi)
1 )
∆µi,S(0)
=
mb · e(g1, g2)
r
e(gr, g1)s
=
mb · e(g1, g
s)r
e(g1, gr)s
= mb
It’s clear that Yang et al.’s Bio-IBE scheme is broken. That is their scheme
is not chosen-plaintext secure. Notice that, in a Bio-IBE scheme, a user with
identity w of course can decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under identity w′ using
his secret key if |w′
⋂
w| ≥ d. Form the above attack, we know that a user with
identity w can also decrypt ciphertexts encrypted under identity w′ using his
secret key even though |w′
⋂
w| < d. Consequently, a valid user can decrypt
any ciphertext encrypted under any identity using his secret key in Yang et al.
scheme.
5 Conclusion
Recently, Yang et al. [8] proposed a constant-size Bio-IBE scheme and proved
that it is adaptively chosen-ciphertext secure in the random oracle model. In this
paper, however, we have indicated that their scheme is even not chosen-plaintext
secure.
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